The Government's proposed new 'Regulated Asset Base' (RAB) means of funding nuclear has just been published, and it is living as far down to its expectations as could be expected. I've ploughed through the sometimes (deliberately?) convoluted description of the scheme and translated a few key passages to help you understand it all.
The Government failed to learn from the days when nuclear power were constructed from the 1950s to the 1990s. In those days nuclear power was very expensive, but the Government was able to con the public into believing that it was cheap. They did this by making sure the public could not understand the vaguaries of nuclear power funding and by putting all of the cost overruns that building the power stations involved onto consumer bills without them noticing. Basically, we are reurning to these days when the public was kept in the dark about the cost of building nuclear power plant and the same public will be paying for the cost overruns resulting from the project.
The Government made the mistake of giving a contract price for Hinkley C. Although it featherbedded the developers EDF by giving an ultra long premium price contract (35 years) and the promise of Government lending to cover the bulk of the costs, the contract (CfD) allowed some sort of comparison to be made with competitior sources. Solar and wind power's costs have fallen well below the price given to Hinkley C (£92.50 in 2012 prices).
So now the Government, having learned this mistake, has produced the RAB. This will allow the Government, though an appointed 'Regulator' to launder electricity consumer's money to pay for the inevitable cost overruns, whilst the Regulator assures the public that this all represents 'value for money'. The project that is earmarked for RAB funding is Sizewll C, involving the same reactor type (EPR) as is being constructed at Hinkley C.
What some key passages mean:
1. 'Despite the progress at HPC, the challenges facing the global nuclear industry have meant that replicating a CfD model for further new nuclear projects has proved very challenging. Few project developers have a balance sheet that can accommodate the £15-20bn cost of delivering a new nuclear project, and financial investors have been unwilling to invest during the construction phase given the long construction period and risk of cost increases and delays. We are therefore looking to work with the sector to develop an alternative funding model for new nuclear projects that can attract private finance at a cost that represents value for money to consumers and are considering its wider applicability to other firm low carbon technologies' (page 9)
Translation: The Hinkley C contract (CfD) was a big boobie by the UK Government since it showed just how expensive nuclear power could be even if we believe the developers own (French Government backed) hopes that the project works out as planned. The nuclear industry around the world has tanked - all the projects in the West this century have been monumental disasters and even the French EPR model built in China took twice as long to build as planned. (As a rule of thumb the cost is more or less directly proportional to its construction time). So no private investor in their right minds would invest in nuclear power. So, essentially, we've got to give the next nuclear project a state-backed blank cheque and cover this up by having a Regulator publish a lot of accountancy jargon that will fool the public into thinking they're getting a reasonable deal.
2. 'A large-scale new nuclear project bears some similarities with the Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) project, in that it is a complex single asset construction project with a significant upfront capital expenditure requirement, long construction period and a long asset life. In developing a potential nuclear RAB model, we have taken the model used for TTT, which was also developed under a RAB, as a starting point, whilst recognising that new nuclear projects are greater in scale and face specific challenges that were not relevant to TTT' (page 11)
Translation: Nuclear power stations are not real power plant, but rather they are giant civil engineering projects involving lots of radiation when they get switched on, and thus complex measures to protect the public. However, this great complexity means they are much more prone to cost overruns compared to projects like the TTT, so we have to make sure that the consumer picks up the tab for the cost overruns, whilst pretending that this is a normal well run civil engineering project, which it isn't of course.
3. 'A target total construction cost would be set for the project company which would be used as the Baseline for incentivisation and risk sharing. If construction costs increased above the Baseline, a portion of the additional costs would be added to the RAB, such that the impact would be shared between investors and suppliers (and through them, their consumers) (page 14)...(this approach will) 'provide clarity and certainty to investors, suppliers and consumers, which is particularly important for a large single-asset project with a complex and relatively long construction period' (page 15)
Translation: The Regulator will produce lots of impenetrable accountancy jargon based on hilariously optimistic projections about construction times and costs which the regulator will swallow whole. When the inevitable happens and costs overrun the investors will still get a reasonable rate of return on their investments and the electricity consumers will pay for most of the cost overruns.
4. 'Role of the Regulator
We currently consider that the Regulator should have responsibility for protecting the interests of consumers, whilst having regard to the ability of the project company to finance the project i.e. construction and operation of the plant' (page 19)
Translation: The Regulator will have no choice but to adopt the ridiculously optimistic cost projections and construction time estimates made by the developers (EDF). They will declare the whole project great value for money for the consumer, whilst in practice allowing the developer to run up whatever bills they want and pass most of them onto the consumer. A facade of an auditing system will be set up, but since EDF have all the information anyway, the Regulator will not be able to make more than token adjustments even if they wanted to.When the time comes for the consumer to shell out for cost overruns the Regulator will not want to point this out too much as they will get the blame.
'The EPR technology has now started commercial operations in China' (pages 8-9)
Translation: So far the constructions of the EPR have been disastrous in all cases, in Finland, France and even in China. The last one is a bit of a shocker. It took twice as long as planned to get the first reactor at Taishan generating electricity - that's despite the fact that the Chinese have a massive reserve of workers and engineers compared to us, and, as our Office for Nuclear Regulation has put it, a different approach to health and safety compared to what is practiced in the UK. Of course EDF are announcing a 'triumph' of early construction at Hinkley C - yet they have only just started seriously constructing the project in March this year having spent a lot of money since 2013 acheving remarkably little. But EDF have the French Government to rely upon to fund its own (French state owned) reactor model at Hinkley. In the case of Sizewell C, through the aegis of the so-called RAB mechanism, it will be the British electricity consumer who will be paying for the cost overruns.
You can read the Government's RAB consultation and make a response at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/regulated-asset-base-rab-model-for-nuclear
I really like this article. The translation paragraphs are beautifully expressed - almost read like poetry, and I hope thant many residents of Old Blighty, and those beyond her shores, will read it and cogitate upon it. And then even make their informed response to the UK government.
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